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Abstract  Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy 
and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that 
decentralizes political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper 
analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the 
individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the 
relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that 
there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size 
of the shadow economy). 
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 2 
1 Introduction 
 
Why do people pay taxes? This question has attracted increased attention in the tax 
compliance literature over the last few years. It can be supposed that nobody likes to pay 
taxes. One possibility is to “force” people to pay their taxes by establishing a deterrence 
policy. In line with the economics-of-crime approach based on the expected utility 
maximisation calculus, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a formal model showing that 
the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and the 
degree of punishment. However, this seminal model has since been criticised by many authors 
(see, e.g., Graetz and Wilde 1985; Alm, McClelland and Schulze 1992; Frey and Feld 2002). 
A great deal of dispute surrounds the empirical and experimental findings, as these deterrence 
models predict a comparatively high incidence of tax evasion. In many countries the actual 
level of deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance. Furthermore, there 
is a considerable gap between the amount of risk aversion that is required to guarantee such 
compliance and the effectively reported degree of risk aversion. For the United States, the 
estimated Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is between one and two, but only a value of 
30 would explain the observed compliance rate (see Graetz and Wilde 1985, Alm, McClelland 
and Schulze 1992). Similarly, in Switzerland the relative risk aversion varies between 1 and 2, 
but a value of 30.75 would be necessary to reach the observed level of tax compliance of 
76.52 % (see Frey and Feld 2002). Furthermore, tax compliance experiments mostly report a 
higher level of income declaration than the expected utility model would predict (for a survey 
see Torgler 2002).  
To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, many researchers have argued that tax 
morale
1
 can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (for empirical and experimental 
                                                 
1
 First important findings in the tax morale literature date from the 1960s and 1970s by German scholars around 
Günter Schmölders (1951/1952, 1960, 1962, 1970) known as the „Cologne school of tax psychology‟. They have 
emphasised that economic phenomena should not be analysed only from the traditional point of view. They saw 
tax morale as an attitude regarding tax (non-) compliance (see, e.g., Schmölders 1960).  
 3 
papers see, e.g., Schwartz and Orleans 1967; Lewis 1982; Roth, Scholz and Witte 1989; Alm, 
McClelland and Schulze, 1992, 1999; Pommerehne, Hart and Frey 1994; Frey 1997; Frey and 
Feld 2002; Feld and Tyran 2002; for a survey see Torgler 2001). A theoretical approach by 
Erard and Feinstein (1994) demonstrates the relevance of integrating moral sentiments into 
the models to provide a reasonable explanation of actual compliance behaviour. Moreover, in 
their overview paper on tax compliance, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) point out that 
“adding moral and social dynamics to models of tax compliance is as yet a largely 
undeveloped area of research” (1998: 852). Many researchers find that a considerable portion 
of taxpayers are always honest. Some taxpayers are “simply predisposed not to evade” (Long 
and Swingen 1991: 130) and thus do not even search for ways to cheat at taxes (see Frey 
1999). Increasing numbers of papers go beyond treating tax morale as a black box, a 
residuum, and analyse which factors shape or maintain tax morale (for an overview see 
Torgler 2007). In addition, policymakers have become interested in understanding the driving 
forces of tax morale and the possibility that it influences willingness to pay taxes.  
In the first part of the paper, we use Swiss data to investigate whether there is a 
relationship between decentralized political competencies and the willingness to comply. 
Thus, we evaluate whether local autonomy is correlated with tax morale (controlling for other 
factors). For this first section, we investigate a cross-section of individuals throughout 
Switzerland using the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data set “Religion II”. 
The second part of the paper explores the same question but uses the size of the shadow 
economy instead of tax morale as the dependent variable. Use of this variable addresses a 
relevant issue: whether results obtained on tax morale are also reflected in real, or observed, 
behaviors. To this end, we complement the attitudinal level investigation of tax morale with a 
more output-oriented variable, namely the shadow economy. Further, it is possible that the 
size of the underground economy can serve as a useful, if somewhat imperfect, measure of the 
extent of tax evasion (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider, 2004). Thus, in the second part 
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of the paper we will investigate the extent to which local autonomy affects the size of the 
shadow economy. This second section also uses Swiss data to complement the micro 
approach with a macro approach at the cantonal level. It is essential to determine under which 
conditions it is more likely that citizens pay their taxes. Switzerland has been selected as the 
subject of our analysis because it allows observation of the influence of institutional factors, 
because cantons have different degrees of fiscal decentralization.  
Interestingly, the link between local autonomy and tax morale, tax compliance or the 
size of the shadow economy has been disregarded in the literature. Most of the papers using 
Swiss data focus on direct democracy. Estimating a cross section/time series multiple 
regression Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) found that in cantons with a high 
degree of direct political control, tax evasion is – ceteris paribus – about SFr 1500 lower  
compared to the average of the cantons without such direct influence. Feld and Frey (2002b) 
analysed how tax authorities treat taxpayers in Switzerland and found that tax authorities of 
cantons with more direct participation rights, compared to cantons with less direct democracy, 
treat taxpayers more respectfully and are less suspicious if taxpayers report incomes that seem 
too low. On the other hand, non-submission of tax declarations is more heavily fined. Looking 
at the experimental evidence, Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1999); Feld and Tyran (2002); 
Torgler and Schaltegger (2005); and Torgler, Schaltegger and Schaffner (2003) found that 
voting on tax issues has a positive effect on tax compliance. The experiments were conducted 
in the United States, Latin America and Switzerland. Torgler (2005) also shows a positive 
effect of voting on tax morale using Swiss data. Tyler‟s research (1990a, 1990b, 1997) also 
provides support for the importance of legitimacy and allegiance to authority in compliance 
decisions. Alm, Jackson and McKee (1993) analyze the effects of fiscal institutions on 
compliance by varying the process by which tax collection becomes a public good (voting 
versus imposition). Donations given to a campus organization were taken as public good. So, 
the public good was not distributed directly to the subjects, but sent to a specific organization. 
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The experimental results provide evidence that tax compliance is higher when individuals can 
vote on the use of their taxes than when there is no voting over alternatives. Individuals are 
more likely to comply with the requirement to pay their taxes when they are able to select the 
public sector expenditure program. On the other hand, tax compliance is lower when subjects 
cannot control the use of their tax payments. Thus, the way people are treated by the 
authorities affects their evaluation of these authorities and their willingness to co-operate (see, 
e.g., Tyler, Casper and Fisher 1989). Working with the World Values Survey, Torgler and 
Schneider (2007a) also explore the relevance of culture in three multicultural European 
countries, namely Belgium, Spain and Switzerland. Other studies such as Torgler and 
Schneider (2007b) or Friedman et al. (2000) explore the importance of institutional quality at 
the international level. Using more than 25 proxies to measure governance and institutional 
quality, Torgler and Schneider (2007b) find strong support that the quality of institutions is 
related to a smaller shadow economy. However, they disregarded the analysis of 
decentralization and local autonomy.   
Section 2 presents theoretical considerations focusing on local autonomy. Section 3 
and 4 present the empirical findings and Section 5 finishes with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 Decentralization 
 
The literature on fiscal federalism pioneered by Oates‟s (1972) work on the advantages of a 
decentralized provision of publicly provided goods has discussed the pros and cons of 
decentralisation at length (for a survey, see Oates, 2008). In short, the main advantages of 
decentralization are seen in public goods that are better tailored to the needs of the voters 
(Oates, 1972), in endogenous restrictions to a Leviathan-behaving government (Lockwood, 
2006) and in incentives for political innovations (Rose-Ackerman, 1980). On the other hand, 
disadvantages of decentralisation are seen in various kinds of distortions: namely urban 
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externalities, fiscal externalities (vertically and horizontally) and local protection that may 
result in a race to the bottom with taxes and consequently an underprovision of public goods 
(see Oates, 1999 for a survey).  
The advantage of smaller structures in tax policy is that citizens‟ preferences are able 
to be better served than in a framework where a uniform tax system is designed for a 
population with heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, there is an intensive everyday 
interaction between taxpayers and local politicians and bureaucrats. This closeness between 
taxpayers, the tax administration and the local government may induce trust and thus enhance 
tax morale. Politicians and members of the administration are better informed about the 
preferences of the local population. Furthermore, there is a politico-institutional aspect: if 
politicians are elected at the local level, they have an incentive to take the preferences of their 
constituency into account and thus to spend the local tax revenues according to local 
preferences (see Frey and Eichenberger 1999). Decentralisation brings the government closer 
to the people. Many economists point out the relevance of giving sub-national governments 
the taxing power (see, e.g., Bahl 1999). One of the strengths of a decentralised system is 
greater transparency between the tax price and the public services received. Taxes are 
comparable to prices in some sense, especially at the local level (Blankart, 2002). Even the 
(progressive) income tax is a good instrument for a local structure. It is always under 
individuals‟ test, providing citizens the opportunity to use the instruments of exit and voice 
(see Hirschman 1970). The mechanism of fiscally induced migration in federal states provides 
a strong incentive to provide public services in accordance to taxpayers‟ preferences. 
Moreover federalism and local autonomy is connected to innovation. Federalism serves as a 
laboratory for policy inventions (Oates 1999). In the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
Louis Brandeis in 1932: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country” (Oates 1999, p. 1132). Feld and 
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Schnellenbach (2004) have analysed different policy fields at the Swiss local level, where this 
kind of laboratory federalism in fact served as a breeding ground for innovations. If voters can 
compare the performance of their government with the performance of neighbouring 
governments with similar conditions, there is also some kind of yardstick competition.
2
 Thus, 
this leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  The more extensive the local autonomy, the higher ceteris paribus tax 
morale and the lower the size of the shadow economy
3
.  
 
 
3 Empirical results on tax morale 
 
3.1. Model 
In order to examine our hypotheses derived in section 2, the following estimation equation is 
postulated for tax morale
4
: 
 
 iiiiiccCi TRCTLYTDDDLATM 76543210  
 
where TMi denotes the individual degree of tax morale. The general question to assess the 
level of tax morale from the ISSP (year 1999) was: 
 
 Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her income in 
order to pay less income taxes? (1= not wrong, 2= a bit wrong, 3= wrong, 4=seriously wrong). 
 
                                                 
2
 The seminal contribution on yardstick competition stems from Besley and Case (1995). 
3
 However, it should be noticed that in Switzerland local authorities administer the largest part of income 
taxpayers. The cantonal level, which is the focus in this paper, copes only with a smaller share of taxpayers 
directly. 
4
 See Appendix Table A1 and A2 for the description and the summary statistics of the variables.  
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The measurement of tax morale is not free of bias. First, because the available data are based 
on self-reports in which subjects may tend to overstate their degree of compliance (Andreoni, 
Erard, and Feinstein 1998), no objective or directly observable measure of tax morale is 
available. Moreover, Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing (1987) found strong differences between 
actual evasion assessed and evasion reported in survey responses. Nonetheless, because the 
way we define tax morale is less sensitive than asking whether a person has evaded taxes, we 
expect the degree of honesty to be higher. Moreover, the dataset is based on wide-ranging 
surveys, which reduces the probability of respondent suspicion and the framing effects of 
other tax context questions. It can still be argued, however, that a taxpayer who has evaded in 
the past will tend to excuse this kind of behavior and report a higher tax morale in the survey.  
In general, the use of such a single question has the advantage of reducing problems of 
index construction complexity, especially in regard to measurement procedure or low 
correlation between items. Nonetheless, it can also be argued that tax morale is a 
multidimensional concept that requires a multi-item measurement tool and the likelihood of a 
multi-item index being adversely affected by random errors will produce more reliable 
measures. However, several previous studies have found consistent results using single-item 
survey measurements and laboratory experiments (e.g., Cummings et al., 2009; Alm and 
Torgler 2006).  
Our key independent variable is local autonomy (LAc). Local autonomy is measured at 
the cantonal level (c) with an index developed by Ladner (1994) based on survey results 
where chief local administrators in 1865 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they 
perceive their local autonomy on a 10 point scale. (1= no autonomy, 10 = very high 
communal autonomy). 
The other independent variables are specified as follows: 
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1. DDc: For the degree of direct democracy the six-point scale index developed by 
Stutzer (1999) and applied, e.g., by Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002); Frey and Feld 
(2002); Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) has been used. The index reflects the extent of 
direct democratic participation (1= lowest and 6 highest degree of participation) at the 
cantonal level.
5
 As indexes do not reveal as much as a single instrument, we are going 
to measure the degree of direct democratic participation with a dummy on legislative 
referendum and degree of signature requirements for legislative initiatives. Previous 
papers have stressed that direct democracy has an impact on tax morale and enhances 
taxpayers‟ sense of civic duty (Feld and Frey 2002a, Torgler 2005, Alm, Jackson and 
McKee 1993) 
2. Ti: Individual tax rate and Yi: The individuals‟ household income (see Appendix Table 
A1). These are common factors used in a tax compliance model (see Alm 1999, 
Torgler 2002, 2007).  
3. TRi: measures using the ISSP data set the confidence in the courts and the legal 
system
6
. In general, it can be argued that positive actions by the state are intended to 
increase taxpayers‟ positive attitudes and commitment to the tax system and tax-
payment and thus compliant behaviour (e.g., Smith 1992; Smith and Stalans 1991). 
One may raise the criticism that cantons with more local autonomy and direct 
democracy have better governments and therefore people are more willing to pay their 
taxes in a state that works better. This would, for example, suggest that an 
improvement in tax morale is independent of whether a particular citizen has the 
opportunity to vote. Thus, to isolate the relationship between institutions and tax 
                                                 
5
 The index includes the four legal instruments: the popular initiative to change the canton‟s constitution, the 
popular initiative to change the canton‟s law, the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new law or 
changing of a law and the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. The index is 
based on the degree of restrictions in form of the necessary signatures necessary for using an instrument, the time 
span to collect the signatures and the level of new expenditure which requires use of the financial referendum 
(for a detailed discussion see Stutzer, 1999).  
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morale it is important to control for institutional trust. Alternatively, one could also try 
to include a dummy for “foreigners”, as they are not involved in the voting process. 
Unfortunately, this information is not provided by the ISSP data set.   
4. Di : measures deterrence focusing on the audit probability by approximating the 
number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰) in each canton c and the penalty tax rate 
approximated by the standard legal fine as a multiple of the evaded tax amount (in 
percent)
 
in a canton c. It is difficult to predict the effects of deterrence factors on tax 
morale. We are therefore including this variable sequentially in the specification. 
Deterrence imposed by the tax authority might crowd out taxpayers‟ intrinsic 
motivation to pay their taxes and thus crowd out tax morale. On the other hand, 
deterrence factors might prevent taxpayers with a low tax morale exploiting the more 
honest taxpayers. Tax morale is therefore not expected to be crowded out if the honest 
taxpayers perceive the stricter policy to be directed against dishonest taxpayers. The 
economics-of-crime approach may be more reliable when focusing on the shadow 
economy. The model would predict that the extent of the shadow economy depends 
negatively on the probability of being caught and the size of punishment in case of 
being caught.
7
 
5. CTLi : further control variables (age, gender, education, marital and employment status 
and religiosity). As a robustness test we are also going to control for cultural 
differences. Such control variables have been used in the past and report a positive 
correlation for age, gender, and religiosity, and being married, a negative for self-
employment and mixed results for the variable education (Torgler 2006, 2007).  
 
3.2. Results 
                                                                                                                                                         
6
 How much confidence do you have in courts and the legal system (5=complete confidence to 1=no confidence 
at all). 
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We present weighted ordered probit models. Some groups might be over-sampled. A 
weighted variable helps to correct the samples and thus to reflect national distribution. The 
weighted ordered probit models help analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent 
variable tax morale. As in the ordered probit estimation, the equation has a non-linear form; 
only the sign of the coefficient can be directly interpreted and not its size. Calculating the 
marginal effects is therefore a method of determining the quantitative effect a variable has on 
tax morale. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of taxpayers (or the 
probability of) belonging to a specific tax morale level, when the independent variable 
increases by one unit. In the weighted ordered probit estimation, only the marginal effects for 
the highest value “seriously wrong not to report all the income” (ISSP 1998) are shown.  
We report clustering-robust standard errors (or t-statistics) for all tax morale 
regressions as we combine data on tax morale at the individual level with institutional data at 
the cantonal level. If the random errors are correlated at the cantonal level, the standard errors 
of the coefficient on the institutional variables are underestimated. Moulton (1990) has shown 
that failing to take this correlation into account would lead to a serious downward bias in the 
estimated errors, resulting therefore in inflated t-statistics and perhaps spurious finding of 
statistical significance for the institutional variable. 
The results of 12 regressions are presented in Table 1 to 3. First we explore in Table 1 
only LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA) as an institutional variable, including in (2) T (tax rate), 
and in (3) TR (institutional trust). In a second step, we add in Table 2 DD (direct democracy) 
(4) and D, the two deterrence factors (5). In equation (6) we also test the robustness of model 
using an OLS instead of an ordered probit model. In this case we report beta or standardized 
regression coefficients to explore the relative importance of local autonomy. In Table 3 we 
conduct a further robustness test. We control for cultural differences using a language dummy 
LATIN (French and Italian speaking individuals) while running all of the previous 
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 Young, Reksulak and Shughart (2001) find a great deal of geographic variation in the tax compliance efforts of 
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regressions. Torgler and Schneider (2007a) have shown the importance of controlling for 
culture differences within a country.  
As can be seen, there is a strong and positive correlation between LA and TM (tax 
morale). The coefficient is always statistically significant and the marginal effects indicate 
that an increase in LA by one point raises the share of persons indicating the highest TM 
value by more than three percentage points. Thus, the results show that we cannot reject our 
main hypothesis. Specification (6) also shows the relative importance of LA. An increase of 
one standard deviation in LA leads to a 0.116 standard deviations increase in TM. Table 2 
indicates that the LA has one of the largest standardized coefficients.  
Looking at the other variable we also observe that DD matters. The coefficient is 
statistically significant with marginal effects close to two percentage points. Frey and Stutzer 
(2000) argue that direct democracy and local autonomy are interdependent. Direct democracy 
and federal structures reinforce each other because individuals are interested in a strong 
federalism. They are bearing the costs and benefits of governments‟ activities, which help 
taxpayers better identify with the decision process. In general, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) 
point out that: “The more important regional and local jurisdictions are in the internal 
organization of a nation-state, the more important is the question of the proper decision-
making procedures at the different government levels. The assignment of competencies to 
different government levels is linked to decision-making procedures” (p. 333)8. However, to 
investigate whether the positive correlation between institutions and tax morale is largely 
driven by a higher institutional trust (TR), adding the variable in specifications (3) to (6) and 
(9) to (12) together into the same equations. The results also indicate that TR is relevant. An 
increase in the TR scale by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating the highest TM 
scale by around 3 percentage points. A priori, we may have expected that adding the trust 
                                                                                                                                                         
the IRS.  
8
 The two variables are significantly correlated at the 0.01 level (r = 0.574). Thus, it is difficult to separate the 
effects of the two variables in one model. 
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variable in the specification would lead to a reduced value for the institutional variable if 
institutional trust acts as a mediator variable. However, as specification (3) shows, we do not 
observe a decrease in the marginal effect of LA once we include trust.  
The results also show that there is a positive correlation between CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE and TM. To the authors‟ knowledge, only a limited number of studies 
examine the correlation between religiosity and tax cheating (Tittle 1980; Grasmick et al. 
1991; Torgler 2006). All three studies indicate that religiosity is negatively correlated with the 
degree of rule breaking; or in other words, is positively related to tax compliance and tax 
morale. Our findings are therefore in line with these results. Looking at the variables FINE 
RATE, AUDIT PROBABILITY and T (INDIVIDUAL TAX RATE) we find that the basic 
tax evasion model does not perform in a satisfactory way when considering tax morale. 
Deterrence shows a negative coefficient that is not statistically significant. Similarly, we 
observe a negative and insignificant relationship between the individual tax rate and tax 
morale. Similarly, the income variable is not statistically significant. The negative sign is 
consistent with many empirical papers analyzing the correlation between tax rates and tax 
evasion (see, e.g., Clotfelter 1983; Crane and Nourzad 1992)
9
. The results presented in Table 
3 indicate that culture matters. French and Italian speaking individuals report a lower level of 
tax morale than German speaking individuals. Such a result is consistent with Alm and 
Torgler (2006), who report that Romanic countries have a higher tax immorality than most 
other northern European countries.   
 
4 Empirical results on the shadow economy 
The previous results provide strong support for our hypothesis that local autonomy 
matters for compliance with tax laws. In a next step we will see whether this relationship 
                                                 
9
 It should also be noticed that Feinstein (1991) does not find a positive correlation between tax rates and non-
compliance, trying to better separate the effects of marginal tax rates from those of income. 
 14 
remains robust when focusing on the shadow economy with macro (cantonal) data. We 
therefore take the opportunity to extend the investigation from the attitudinal level to a 
behavioural one. This is especially important since it allows a further robustness check and 
provides the chance to control for additional variables at the cantonal level. 
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services 
that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons (Schneider 
2005b):  
(1) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 
(2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
(4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
 
Hence, in this paper, we will not deal with typical underground economic activities, which are 
all illegal actions with the characteristics of classical crimes like burglary, robbery and drug 
dealing. We also do not include the informal household economy which consists of all 
household services and production.  
The size and development of the shadow economy of the 26 cantons for the years 
1990, 1995 and 2000 were calculated using the following step procedure: first, the aggregated 
values of the size and development of the Swiss (overall) shadow economy are calculated 
using the currency demand approach. A currency demand equation was estimated for 
Switzerland over the period 1955 up to 2002. The results at the OLS estimations (corrected 
for first-order autocorrelation) are reported in the Appendix Table A3. The overall 
development of the Swiss shadow economy was calculated from this currency demand 
equation keeping the tax variable at its lowest value and undertaking a dynamic simulation 
that generates overall (aggregate) shadow economy values for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000. 
In order to get the disaggregated (cantonal) value we use a decomposition method. It takes 
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into account the sector composition and its level of shadow economy (see also Appendix 
Table A3 and A4). The methodology employed in these estimation procedures has been 
discussed in previous studies (see Schneider and Enste 2002, and Schneider 2005a,b)
10
. Note, 
that with this approach, a lot of the variation in the size of the shadow economy over time is 
due to the sectoral change in the cantons.  
 
4.1 Model 
 
To explore the relationship between local autonomy and the level of shadow economy, we 
propose the following baseline equation
11
:  
 
SHADOWit =  + 1 CTLit + 2 Cit + 3 DDit+ TDt + CDi + it    (2) 
 
where i indexes the canton in the sample, SHADOWit denotes cantons‟ size of the shadow 
economy as a percentage of the official GDP over the periods 1990, 1995 and 2000. Cit and 
DDit are our proxies for centralization and direct democracy. We use the previous index and 
calculate values for these three years. The previously used proxy for local autonomy cannot be 
used as it has only been collected once. Thus, we take an alternative proxy that measures 
cantonal degree of centralization, namely the share of cantonal public spending on cantonal 
and local spending. The regressions also contain several control variables CTLit. To control 
for time as well as cantonal invariant factors, we include fixed time, TDt, and fixed cantonal 
effects, CDi. It is important to control for time-specific effects in the analysis as we observe a 
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 As has been extensively discussed such estimation methods have their weaknesses. The MIMIC procedure 
requires a clear differentiation between causes and indicators, which is not easy to achieve; the estimates are 
quite often not stable and if time series are used for the cause and indicator variables, they should be stationary. 
The currency demand approach requires observation on local domestic currency holdings as it excludes barter 
transactions. The assumption of the same velocity of the money in the official and underground economy can 
also be criticised, as well as missing variables (like tax morale, or other influences) as driving forces for the 
shadow economy. To summarize, all known estimation procedures for the size of the shadow economy have 
severe weaknesses; hence there is no best method and one has to live with an error of 15 to 20% of the size and 
development of the shadow economy.  
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secular upward trend both in the degree of fiscal centralization and the size of the shadow 
economy (see Figures A1 to A5). Moreover, it also helps to address concerns regarding 
pseudo variation in the fiscal centralization variable that is caused by business cycle effects. it 
denotes the error term. In order to fulfill the ceteris paribus conditions, we have to control for 
a number of other important factors. GDP growth is a proxy for the level of development and 
prosperity of a region. A higher level of development goes together with a greater capacity to 
pay and collect taxes, as well as a higher relative demand for income elastic public goods and 
services (Chelliah 1971; Bahl 1971). In general, we would expect a negative relation between 
the GDP growth and the level of the shadow economy. Demographic and labor characteristics 
such as population size or the labor force may also affect the shadow economy. The labor 
force variable measures the potential pool that is most likely to work in the shadow economy. 
On the other hand, individuals with an occupation have less leisure time at their disposal. 
Thus, time acts as a restriction to being active in the shadow economy. Unemployed people 
have an incentive not to report their additional work hours as they may lose their financial 
support (Schneider and Enste 2002). In line with the micro estimations, we control for 
occupation. Moreover, a higher level of urbanization may further anonymity and thus reduce 
loyalty towards the state; this may lead to a higher level of shadow economy. As many sectors 
are city-based, it is expected that the incentives to act in the underground economy there are 
higher, especially when government activities and services are below individuals‟ 
expectations and preferences. Moreover, we control not only for the overall population size 
but (in line with the micro estimation) also for the demographic structure within a society 
(share of elderly and the share of pupils). Deterrence and education are further controls. As a 
proxy for education we use cantonal expenditures on education. This variable covers all 
publicly provided education spending for basic education, high-schools, professional 
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 See Appendix Table A1 and A2 for the description and the summary statistics of the variables.  
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formation and cantonal universities in Switzerland which accounts for approximately ¼ of all 
cantonal spendings.  
We also consider the share of REGISTERED CANTONAL HOUSE PROPRIETORS 
on the cantonal population
12
. The commitment made by house proprietors to their jurisdiction 
by voluntarily increasing their opportunity costs of exit option to migrate to another 
jurisdiction may support the willingness to remain honest. On the other hand, house 
proprietors have a strong demand for those economic sectors that have the highest rates of 
illicit work. Schneider and Enste (2002) report that building, renovating and repairing provide 
the largest share of illicit work (44% of the total illicit work) in Germany. Such results are 
also applicable to Switzerland (Table A4). Thus, home proprietors may have a stronger 
incentive to take advantage of such services that increase the shadow economy. Finally, we 
also control for transfer payments (TRANSFERS) between the federal level and the cantons 
according to the federal fiscal equalization scheme. The financial equalization scheme 
between the cantons and the federal level aims to provide equal opportunities and fair 
positions among the cantons with respect to the production of public goods and services. 
However, cantons receiving extensive transfer payments are possibly subject to the “flypaper 
effect” with incentives for increased government spending and thus in consequence are less 
financially healthy and independent. This may be an indicator of institutional weakness that 
may also affect compliance. Remarkably, these imperfections were also the reasons why the 
financial equalization system had been under pressure due to the lack of transparency and 
adverse incentives that promoted centralization. Moreover, the lack of incentives of cantons to 
fulfil their responsibilities on their own has also been criticized (Schaltegger and Frey, 2003). 
The fiscal burden is expected to influence the shadow economy positively. It can be argued 
that a higher burden increases the attractiveness of behaving illegally. We expect a positive 
                                                 
12
 For summary statistics see Appendix.  
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correlation between the fiscal burden and the size of shadow economy. However, using such a 
proxy has some limitations. It can be argued that it is not so much the statutory tax rates that 
are relevant in the decision to behave illegally, but rather their application, offering tax 
exceptions or concessions that affect individual decisions (Friedman et al. 2000). The authors 
could not find evidence that higher direct or indirect tax rates are associated with a larger 
unofficial economy. On the contrary, they find some evidence that higher direct tax rates are 
associated with a smaller shadow economy. Such results are also supported by Dreher and 
Schneider (2006). To analyse a further proxy for governance we consider cantonal deficits. A 
larger deficit may indicate that the government is responsible for a larger share of public 
goods provision, meaning that there is a lower incentive or higher moral costs to be active in 
the underground economy. On the other hand, larger deficits may induce fiscal changes in the 
future (e.g., increase in tax burden) that might be anticipated by the people, resulting in a 
counter-effect.   
 
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 presents the results reporting four regressions. We report beta or standardized 
regression coefficients to reveal the relative importance of the variables used. To obtain robust 
standard errors in these estimations, we use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard 
errors. In all the estimations the coefficient for centralization (C) is statistically significant 
with relatively large beta coefficients. Thus, a higher level of centralization is positively 
correlated with an increase in the size of the shadow economy (SHADOW). Such a result 
supports our previous finding. In the second specification we add direct democracy (DD). In 
the following specifications we add sequentially the proxies for DETERRENCE
13
 and the 
                                                 
13
 We only consider the audit probability as fine rate is directly related to tax evasion and not the shadow 
economy.   
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TAX BURDEN. The remaining two regressions also show that previous results are valid. 
Centralization matters at the macro level when we focus on the shadow economy and not tax 
morale. Thus, we find that institutional conditions are connected to individuals‟ attitudes and 
their behavior.    
Looking at the control variables we find a negative relationship between DD and 
SHADOW. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant
14
. LABOR FORCE is 
negatively correlated with SHADOW. It seems that time acts as a restriction on being active 
in the shadow economy. Such a result is also supported when looking at the correlation 
between POPULATION>65 and SHADOW.  On the other hand, the UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATE does not matter at all. Surprisingly, the results also show a positive correlation between 
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES and SHADOW. As an interpretation, this may reflect the 
fact that with a rising government size, opportunities in the shadow economy are also rising, 
independent of the specific government task. The positive relationship between TRANSFERS 
and SHADOW points in the same direction. We also observe that a larger deficit due to more 
spending in relation to revenue generation reduces the shadow economy. Moreover, an 
increase in the SHARE OF REGISTERED HOUSE PROPRIETORS is positively correlated 
with SHADOW, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. We also find the tendency 
for URBANIZATION and GDP GROWTH to be positively correlated with SHADOW. 
However, neither coefficient is statistically significant. In addition, we were not able to find a 
positive correlation between the fiscal burden and the size of shadow economy. It can be 
argued that it is not so much the statutory tax rates that are relevant in the decision to behave 
illegally, but rather their application (Friedman et al., 2000). The authors couldn‟t find 
evidence that higher direct or indirect tax rates are associated with a larger unofficial 
economy. On the contrary, they find some evidence that higher direct tax rates are associated 
with a smaller shadow economy. Such results are also supported by Dreher and Schneider 
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(2006) and Torgler and Schneider (2007b). Finally, the strength of the time and cantonal 
specific effects were evaluated using joint hypothesis tests. The F-statistics indicate that in 
both cases the hypothesis is rejected, meaning that time and cantonal specific effects play a 
significant role in the determination of the size of the shadow economy.  
What about the causality between local autonomy and tax morale or the shadow 
economy? In Switzerland, people vote not only on aspects of the tax structure, but also on the 
institutional structure. It can be stated that values and attitudes, which may partially differ 
across cantons, determine the extent of institutional structure in the long run. Thus, the effect 
of the institutions may partly reflect values. In other words, do taxpayers with a higher tax 
morale demonstrate a strong preference for local autonomy or direct democratic institutions? 
Moreover, a substantial increase of the shadow economy can lead to a significant decrease in 
tax revenues and therefore to a lower quantity and quality of public goods and services. In line 
with Frey (2001) and Frey and Stutzer (2000) it could be argued that institutions such as local 
autonomy and direct democracy have a long tradition in Switzerland and are quite stable over 
time, which suggests that the causality runs from institutions to tax morale or the size of the 
shadow economy and not the other way round. Figures A2 to A7 report the changes in these 
institutions over time at the national and cantonal level. The cantonal values in Figures A4 
and A7 indicate relative stable values. However, the boxplot in Figure A5 shows that there is 
a certain variation within the cantons over time (see median values and quartiles) that 
provides enough information to warrant investigation as a suitable explanatory determinant. In 
addition, one should note that the decentralization variables often exhibit a pseudo-variation 
which is caused by the fact that the tax base of sub-national governments is affected 
differently by the business cycle than the tax base of the national government.
15
 However, 
based on this analysis it is not possible to fully rule out the causality problem.  
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 The coefficient is statistically significant if we do not control for year specific effects.  
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5 Conclusions 
 
In the last two decades the numbers of studies investigating the underground economy or tax 
compliance have increased significantly. Generating statistics and empirical results are  
important insofar as it allows having effective and efficient resource allocation decisions. A 
similar tendency is observable in other areas that investigate illegal activities (Schneider and 
Enste 2000, 2002; and Schneider 2005a). Although there are more and more studies that 
investigate the causes of shadow economic activities, societies often attempt to control these 
activities through measures such as punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education 
(Schneider and Enste 2002). However, there are further instruments that merit more attention. 
In this respect, it is highly relevant to undertake our current investigation using other variables 
such as local autonomy. Thus, the basic intention of this paper was to analyse the effects of a 
bottom-up approach to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. Specifically, we 
evaluate the impact of federalism on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy, a factor 
that the literature largely has neglected so far. We therefore provide evidence using Swiss data 
at the micro and macro (cantonal) level. The results indicate that local autonomy is highly 
relevant to an understanding of why people cooperate with societies‟ rules. Institutions that 
respect the preferences of the citizens will have more support from the people than a state that 
acts as a Leviathan, and thus a responsive government will enhance tax morale. Both 
instruments facilitate spending of taxes according to the citizens‟ preferences, which increases 
the motivation to pay the taxes. A high level of local autonomy allows the expression of one‟s 
own preferences and enhances identification with a state‟s institutions; this counteracts the 
inclination to be active in the shadow economy and increases the willingness to pay taxes. 
Identification therefore reduces free-rider problems. If citizens and authorities interact with a 
sense of collective responsibility due to the institutional structures, the system may be better 
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governed and the policies more effective, as accountability promotes effectiveness through its 
impact on government behaviour.  
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Table 1: Tax Morale and Local Autonomy 
ISSP 1999                   
weighted ordered probit          
Dependent variable: tax morale          
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
Independent Variables Coeff. 
z-
Stat. Marg. Coeff. 
z-
Stat. Marg. Coeff. 
z-
Stat. Marg. 
a) Institutions          
LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA) 0.193*** 2.79 0.056 0.187*** 2.70 0.054 0.196*** 2.74 0.057 
b) Tax Rate          
INDIVIDUAL INC. TAX RATE 
(T)    -0.006 -0.24 -0.002 -0.005 -0.21 -0.001 
c) Demographic Factors (CTL)          
AGE 30-49 -0.013 -0.12 -0.004 -0.014 -0.12 -0.004 0.065 0.51 0.019 
AGE 50-64 -0.004 -0.03 -0.001 -0.006 -0.05 -0.002 0.063 0.40 0.018 
AGE 65+ -0.029 -0.22 -0.008 -0.032 -0.24 -0.009 0.038 0.24 0.011 
WOMAN 0.078 0.89 0.023 0.078 0.89 0.022 0.077 0.79 0.022 
EDUCATION 0.036 1.58 0.010 0.037 1.58 0.011 0.034 1.49 0.010 
d) Marital Status (CTL)          
MARRIED/LIVING TOGETHER -0.042 -0.44 -0.012 -0.044 -0.45 -0.013 -0.066 -0.68 -0.019 
DIVORCED -0.276 -1.45 -0.071 -0.278 -1.45 -0.072 -0.299 -1.52 -0.077 
SEPARATED 0.181 0.74 0.056 0.181 0.74 0.056 0.141 0.57 0.043 
WIDOWED -0.101 -0.56 -0.028 -0.102 -0.57 -0.028 -0.092 -0.50 -0.026 
e) Economic Variables (Y)          
INCOME 0.1e-04 0.87 0.3e-05 0.000 0.44 0.1e-04 0.2e-04 0.38 0.4e-04 
f) Employment Status (CTL)          
PART TIME EMPLOYED -0.167 -1.22 -0.046 -0.173 -1.22 -0.047 -0.155 -1.06 -0.043 
LESS THAN PART TIME 0.040 0.19 0.012 0.026 0.12 0.007 0.014 0.06 0.004 
UNEMPLOYED -0.054 -0.16 -0.015 -0.068 -0.21 -0.019 0.011 0.03 0.003 
STUDENT 0.362** 2.16 0.116 0.342* 1.89 0.109 0.395** 2.53 0.128 
RETIRED 0.332*** 2.61 0.104 0.317** 2.15 0.099 0.319** 2.20 0.100 
AT HOME 0.160 1.04 0.048 0.144 0.89 0.043 0.146 0.82 0.044 
SICK 0.254 1.24 0.080 0.240 1.39 0.075 0.196 1.27 0.061 
g) Religiosity          
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (CTL) 0.090*** 4.52 0.026 0.090*** 4.43 0.026 0.082*** 3.89 0.024 
h) Trust           
TRUST IN COURT AND 
LEGAL SYSTEM (TR)       0.096*** 3.27 0.028 
Observations 1114   1114   1068   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Pseduo R2 0.027   0.027   0.030   
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, FULL TIME 
EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score 
(4). Standard errors adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons.  
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Table 2: Robustness Tests 
ISSP 1999 weighted ordered probit weighted ordered probit OLS 
Dep. V.: tax morale    
  (4)   (5)  (6)  
Variable Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Beta t-Stat. 
a) Institutions         
LOCAL 
AUTONOMY (LA) 
0.144** 2.05 0.042 0.142** 2.00 0.041 0.116** 2.20 
DIRECT 
DEMOCRATIC 
RIGHTS (DD) 
0.059** 2.02 0.017 0.061* 1.80 0.018 0.055* 1.77 
b) Tax Rate         
INDIVIDUAL INC. 
TAX RATE (T) 
-0.002 -0.11 -0.001 -0.002 -0.11 -0.001 -0.002 -0.15 
e) Demographic 
Factors (CTL) 
        
AGE 30-49 0.066 0.52 0.019 0.066 0.52 0.019 0.042 0.42 
AGE 50-64 0.062 0.39 0.018 0.061 0.39 0.018 0.048 0.43 
AGE 65+ 0.024 0.15 0.007 0.024 0.15 0.007 0.045 0.28 
WOMAN 0.080 0.83 0.023 0.080 0.83 0.023 0.062 0.87 
EDUCATION 0.037 1.60 0.011 0.037 1.59 0.011 0.030 1.64 
f) Marital Status 
(CTL) 
        
MARRIED/LIVING 
TOGETHER 
-0.066 -0.67 -0.019 -0.065 -0.65 -0.019 -0.059 -0.76 
DIVORCED -0.297 -1.53 -0.076 -0.297 -1.54 -0.076 -0.259* -1.88 
SEPARATED 0.149 0.61 0.045 0.150 0.63 0.046 0.084 0.37 
WIDOWED -0.101 -0.56 -0.028 -0.100 -0.55 -0.028 -0.086 -0.59 
g) Economic 
Variables (Y) 
        
INCOME 0.1e-04 0.29 0.3e-05 0.1e-04 0.29 0.3e-05 0.1e-04 0.45 
h) Employment 
Status (CTL) 
        
PART TIME 
EMPLOYED 
-0.151 -1.03 -0.042 -0.151 -1.04 -0.042 -0.111 -1.05 
LESS THAN PART 
TIME 
0.018 0.08 0.005 0.017 0.07 0.005 0.027 0.18 
UNEMPLOYED 0.023 0.07 0.007 0.023 0.07 0.007 0.054 0.22 
STUDENT 0.403*** 2.60 0.131 0.404*** 2.66 0.131 0.316** 2.09 
RETIRED 0.339** 2.27 0.107 0.339** 2.27 0.107 0.272* 1.77 
AT HOME 0.158 0.88 0.048 0.158 0.88 0.048 0.138 1.02 
SICK 0.228 1.58 0.071 0.227 1.59 0.071 0.220 0.97 
i) Religiosity         
CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE (CTL) 
0.083*** 3.95 0.024 0.083*** 3.95 0.024 0.064*** 4.18 
d) Trust          
TRUST IN COURT 
AND LEGAL  
0.093*** 3.22 0.027 0.093*** 3.23 0.027 0.080** 2.29 
SYSTEM (TR)         
a) Deterrence 
Factors (D) 
        
AUDIT 
PROBABILITY  
   -0.3e-04 -0.04 -0.1e-04 0.1e-04 0.01 
FINE RATE    -0.1e-03 -0.10 -0.3e-04 -0.1e-04 -0.01 
Observations 1068   1068   1068  
Prob > chi2 or Prob > 
F 
0.000   0.000   0.000  
(Pseudo) R2 0.031   0.031   0.077  
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, 
FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = 
highest tax morale score (4). OLS estimations: robust standard errors and beta coefficients. Standard errors adjusted to 
clustering in 26 cantons.  
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Table 3: Tax Morale and Culture 
 Ordered Probit OLS 
 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 
LA 0.118* 0.116* 0.129* 0.127* 0.126* 0.102* 
 1.72 1.73 1.79 1.88 1.85 1.91 
 0.034 0.033 0.037 0.037 0.036  
       
LANGUAGE (LATIN) -0.215** -0.199* -0.199* -0.186 -0.192 0.673* 
 -2.13 -1.87 -1.87 -1.05 -1.06 1.92 
 -0.060 -0.056 -0.056 -0.052 -0.053  
       
T NO YES YES YES YES YES 
       
TR NO NO YES YES YES YES 
       
DD NO NO NO YES YES YES 
       
D NO NO NO NO YES YES 
       
CTL YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 1114 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 
Prob > chi2 or Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Pseudo) R2 0.029 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.079 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, 
SINGLE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (4). z-statistics and t-statistics in italics, marginal effects in bold. OLS 
estimations: robust standard errors and beta coefficients. Standard errors adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons.  
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Table 4 Impact of Centralization on the Size of the Shadow Economy 
 
Dep. variable: shadow economy  Beta t-stat.  Beta t-stat.  Beta t-stat.  Beta t-stat.  
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
CENTRALIZATION  (C) 0.368** 2.12 0.365** 2.09 0.314* 1.82 0.304* 1.71 
          
DIRECT DEMOCRACY (DD)   -0.155 -1.08 -0.154 -1.05 -0.121 -0.71 
          
GDP GROWTH 0.058 1.20 0.067 1.29 0.067 1.37 0.061 1.19 
          
TRANSFERS  -0.101 -1.47 -0.084 -1.20 -0.081 -1.22 -0.079 -1.19 
          
DEFICITS -0.246*** -4.55 -0.233*** -4.47 -0.222*** -4.35 -0.223*** -4.32 
          
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES 0.261** 2.13 0.267** 2.13 0.235** 2.16 0.226** 2.06 
          
LABOR FORCE -0.134* -1.88 -0.161* -1.92 -0.182* -1.93 -0.172* -1.71 
          
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE -0.002 -0.04 0.008 0.11 0.025 0.36 0.014 0.19 
        
URBANIZATION 0.407 0.70 0.492 0.80 0.537 0.80 0.437 0.62 
        
POPULATION SIZE -6.456** -2.54 -6.470** -2.54 -6.037** -2.68 -6.137** -2.65 
          
POPULATION  <15 0.432** 2.67 0.442** 2.70 0.410*** 2.89 0.356** 2.12 
          
POPULATION  >65 0.255** 2.70 0.253** 2.62 0.248** 2.39 0.263** 2.43 
          
SHARE OF REGISTERED  -0.473 -0.98 -0.473 -0.99 -0.433 -0.95 -0.576 -0.98 
HOUSE PROPRIETORS          
          
DETERRENCE     0.100 0.92 0.080 0.67 
          
TAX BURDEN       0.063 0.65 
State (Canton) Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-Test Cantons 19.59***  21.70***  19.17***  16.03***  
F-Test Year 19.69***  17.76***  20.33***  15.06***  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Observations 78  78  78  78  
R-squared 0.981   0.981   0.982   0.982   
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table A1 Derivation of variables ISSP 
Variable Derivation 
TAX MORALE (TM, DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE) 
Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or 
her income in order to pay less income taxes? (1. not wrong, 2. a bit wrong, 3. 
wrong, 4. seriously wrong). 
LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA) Local autonomy is measured at the cantonal level (c) with an index developed 
by Ladner (1994) based on survey results where chief local administrators in 
1865 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they perceive their local 
autonomy on a 10 point scale. (1= no autonomy, 10 = very high communal 
autonomy). 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY (DD) Index of direct democracy, own calculation based on Stutzer (1999). 
TRUST IN COURT AN THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM (TR) 
How much confidence do you have in courts and the legal system (5=complete 
confidence to 1=no confidence at all) 
FINE RATE (D) Standard legal fine (in percent) as a multiple of the evaded tax amount based on 
questionnaire data of Frey and Feld (2002); and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) 
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (D) Number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰) based on questionnaire data of Frey 
and Feld (2002); and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) 
INDIVIDUAL TAX RATE (T) Own calculations based on the average weighted value (in percentage) working 
with the income information done by the ISSP. From the tax table 
(Steuerbelastung in der Schweiz 1999, p. 48) the value closest to the ISSP 
income values (midpoint) is used. For simplicity, no differentiation between 
singles and married people has been made, working with the individual tax rate 
table for singles.  
CHURCH ATTENDANCE (CTL) How often do you take part in the activities or organisations of a church or a place of 
worship, other than attending services? Never (1), less than once a year, about once 
or twice a year, several times a year, about once a month, 2-3 times a month, nearly 
every week, every week, several times a week (9) 
INCOME (Y) Monthly earnings from employment in Swiss francs (midpoints) 
EDUCATION (CTL) What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 
1. Incomplete primary school 
2. Primary school (up to 12 years of age) 
3. Incomplete secondary 
4. Secondary completed 
5. Incomplete + complete semi-higher qualification, incomplete 
university, others 
6. University completed 
LATIN French and Italian speakers. 
Source: ISSP (1998) 
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Table A2 Summary statistics micro   
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TAX MORALE (TM) 1143 1.767 0.917 0 3 
LOCAL AUTONOMY (LA) 1204 4.737 0.662 3.2 6.1 
DIRECT DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (DD) 1204 3.599 1.203 1.75 5.69 
INDIVIDUAL INC. TAX RATE (T) 1204 5.890 6.234 0 25.14 
AGE 30-49 1204 0.450 0.498 0 1 
AGE 50-64 1204 0.241 0.428 0 1 
AGE 65+ 1204 0.123 0.328 0 1 
WOMAN 1204 0.534 0.499 0 1 
EDUCATION 1201 3.657 1.681 1 7 
MARRIED/LIVING TOGETHER 1196 0.535 0.499 0 1 
DIVORCED 1196 0.058 0.233 0 1 
SEPARATED 1196 0.023 0.151 0 1 
WIDOWED 1196 0.053 0.223 0 1 
INCOME 1204 2911.296 3445.100 0 22500 
PART TIME EMPLOYED 1201 0.143 0.350 0 1 
LESS THAN PART TIME 1201 0.068 0.252 0 1 
UNEMPLOYED 1201 0.014 0.118 0 1 
STUDENT 1201 0.072 0.258 0 1 
RETIRED 1201 0.142 0.350 0 1 
AT HOME 1201 0.087 0.283 0 1 
SICK 1201 0.009 0.095 0 1 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  1188 2.582 1.825 1 9 
TRUST IN COURT AND LEGAL SYSTEM (TR) 1146 3.119 0.906 1 5 
AUDIT PROBABILITY (D) 1204 53.006 36.141 7.05 188.98 
FINE RATE (D) 1204 78.241 33.292 30 200 
LATIN 1204 0.375 0.484 0 1 
Note: 38% of the individuals stated that they have no own income or no paid work. Excluding this group leads to 
a mean in the individual tax rate of  9.8 percent.  
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 Table A3 Currency demand equation 
log (currency outside banks/M2)t =  -3.501  absolute term 
 (-0.147)  
   
 +0.334 log (real GDP)t 
  (1.46)  
   
 +0.009  wage quota (percent of the wage 
sum to total income)t   (1.49) 
   
  -0.034*  (interest rate on government 
bonds)t   (-2.24) 
   
 +0.022*  burden of direct and indirect 
taxation (total taxes in percent of 
GDP)t  
  (2.43) 
   
 +0.884**  log (currency outside banks/M2)t-1 
 (+3.88) 
R² = 0.97   
F = 188.9   
h = 1.43   
Rho = 0.97   
d.f. = 44   
Note: t-statistics parentheses   
 
 
Table A4 Swiss shadow economy in the he following five sectors:  
(1) construction, craftsmanship including repairing  36% 
(2) Other craftsmanship and industrial firms (cars, machinery …)  17% 
(3) The whole service sector in hotels, restaurants, also catering, etc.  18% 
(4) Entertainment sector, prostitution, gambling, etc.  14% 
(5) Other craftsmanship and all household services, cleaning, gardening, ironing, babysitting, etc.  15% 
Notes: These values are for the year 2006 and are taken from Schneider, Torgler and Schaltegger (2008).  
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Table A5 Descriptive statistics for macro analysis 
Variable name Description Source 
SHADOW ECONOMY Size of the shadow economy per capita ( in 
Mio CHF deflated to the year 1990) 
Own calculations (see Appendix) 
GOVERNMENT  
CENTRALIZATION 
Share of cantonal public spending on cantonal 
and local spending 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY Index of direct democracy Own calculation based on Stutzer (1999) 
GDP GROWTH Logarithm of real cantonal GDP growth per 
capita 
Own calculation based on BAK Basel 
Economics 
EDUCATION 
EXPENDITURES 
publicly provided cantonal education spending 
(logarithmized in the estimations)  
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
TRANSFERS Transfer payments between the federal level 
and the cantons according to the federal fiscal 
equalization scheme (logarithmized in the 
estimations) 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
DEFICIT Real public revenues – real public spending per 
capita (GDP-deflator for 1980 = 1)   
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
LABOR FORCE Share of employment on the cantonal 
population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATE 
Share of unemployment on the cantonal 
population 
Own calculations on the basis of Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office 
URBANIZATION Proportion of local communities having more 
than 10'000 inhabitants.  
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
POPULATION SIZE Cantonal population size (logarithmized in the 
estimations).  
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
POPULATION  <15 Share of cantonal population over age 65 on 
total cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
POPULATION  >65 Share of cantonal population under age 15 on 
total cantonal population 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
SHARE OF 
REGISTERED HOUSE 
PROPRIETORS 
Share of registered house proprietors Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
DETERRENCE  Number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰)  Based on questionnaire data of Frey and 
Feld (2002); and Feld and Frey (2002a, 
2002b) 
TAX BURDEN Cantonal tax burden  Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
 
Table A6 Summary statistics macro 
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SHADOW ECONOMY 78 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.012 
GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION 78 0.680 0.102 0.526 0.978 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 78 4.256 1.200 1.583 5.833 
GDP GROWTH 78 0.008 0.010 -0.020 0.024 
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES 78 2.449 0.157 2.169 2.874 
TRANSFERS 78 3.176 0.076 3.051 3.458 
DEFICIT 78 23.300 242.190 -668.882 710.058 
LABOR FORCE 78 0.502 0.027 0.439 0.564 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 78 1.879 1.800 0.000 7.000 
URBANIZATION 78 0.324 0.250 0.000 0.994 
POPULATION SIZE 78 269450 279041 13573 1211647 
POPULATION  <15 78 0.183 0.022 0.116 0.232 
POPULATION  >65 78 0.148 0.020 0.108 0.209 
SHARE OF REGISTERED HOUSE PROPRIETORS 78 0.412 0.111 0.127 0.612 
DETERRENCE  78 63.188 41.433 3.139 188.98 
TAX BURDEN 78 102.606 19.264 55.80 154.10 
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Figure A1 Size of the Shadow Economy at the Cantonal Level in Mio CHF (deflated to the year 1990) 
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Figure A2 Shadow economy over time in Switzerland, Germany and Austria 
 
 
Figure A3: Government centralization over time (share of state spendings on state and local 
spendings) over 26 cantons 
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Figure A4: Government centralization at the cantonal level of over time 
 
 
Figure A5: Boxplot Reporting the Variation Between 1981 and 2001  
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Figure A6 Development of direct democracy over time in Switzerland (Frey-Stutzer-Index) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7 Degree of Direct Democracy Between 1970 and 1998 at the Cantonal Level 
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Notes: The cantons, which have or had until recently the „Landsgemeinde‟ (town meeting) (Appenzell I. Rh., 
Obwalden, Glarus, Appenzell A. Rh. and Nidwalden), have not been included in these estimations. 
